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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLEVE C. CHILD, EARL L. BOWEN,
ENOCH LUDLOW and J. LEE BUTLER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
vs.
13960
THE CITY OF SPANISH FORK, a
Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

B R I E F OF APPELLANTS

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein
plaintiffs seeks a determination of whether or not the
condition on annexation being imposed by the City of
Spanish Fork is (1) constitutional, (2) an ultra vires
act, (3) reasonable- The imposed condition is as follows:
petitioners for annexation must transfer, without compensation, at least 2 acre feet of Strawberry Valley water
shares to the city for each acre of land to be annexed.
Petitioners must furnish said shares, or the money equivalent thereof, not only for their own property but also
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2
for the property of minority owners who are within the
annexation area but who do not favor the annexation.
DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The District Court, sitting without a jury, treated
defendant's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule
12 (b) of the Uath Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court
ruled that there was no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that therefore defendant was entitled to judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of the District Court. More particularly they seek a determination
of whether or not the condition on annexation being imposed by Spanish Fork City; (1) is unreasonable, (2) is
an ultra vires act, (3) violates the rights of plaintiffs as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 4,1971, and June 15,1972, plaintiffs, pursuant to 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953), petitioned the
City of Spanish Fork to annex certain territory known
as "Wolf Hollow". On February 15, 1973, defendant
city, by resolution determined that plaintiffs' petition
was sufficient under 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953) and voted
in favor of said annexation. (R-51a). On May 2, 1973,
the city council unanimously passed Ordinance No. W-9
declaring the annexation of such territory and the exDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tension of the limits of Spanish Fork City. (R-52a)More than 8 months later, on January 17, 1974, the city
passed another resolution wherein they placed as a further condition on annexation the requirement that proponents for annexation must furnish to the city certain
specific water shares, or such shares' value equivalent in
money. (R-54). Of the property owners in the Wolf
Hollow Territory, not all have joined in the petition
for annexation. Therefore, such minority property owners need not in any event surrender or furnish to the
city any water shares. Consequently, in order to accomplish annexation, plaintiffs herein must purchase or
otherwise acquire water shares to cover the water share
or money deficiency created as a result of the dissenting
property owners' right to ignore said condition. (R-24
and 54).
Prior to February 15, 1973, (the date of the city's
acceptance of plaintiffs' petition for annexation) this
condition on annexation had never before been imposed,
nor was said condition imposed on that date. (R-16).
ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
T H E IMPOSITION OF T H E REQUIREMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS GIVE WATER
S H A R E S TO T H E C I T Y W I T H O U T COMP E N S A T I O N A S A C O N D I T I O N TO G R A N T ING ANNEXATION IS AN ULTRA VIRES
ACT I N T H A T I T GOES BEYOND T H E
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C I T Y ' S D E L I G A T E D P O W E R TO A C Q U I R E
W A T E R S O U R C E S A S S E T F O R T H B Y 10-74 U.C.A. (1953).
In this matter before the Court, there are two general questions that must be first considered.
1. The method by which a municipality
may extend its corporate limits.
2- The means by which a municipality
may acquire water sources.
Plaintiffs argue that each question is separate and distinct and the answer to each is founded in different statutory authority. The means by which a city may extend
its corporate limits is set forth in 10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953)
and the means by which a city may acquire water sources
is found in 10-7-4 U.C.A.
The pertinent portions of 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953)
read as follows: "The . . . city council... of any city or
town may acquire, purchase or lease all or any part of
any water, water works system, water supply or property connected therewith, and whenever the governing
body of a city or town shall deem it necessary for the
public good, such city or town may bring condemnation
proceedings to acquire the same • . . I n all condemnation proceedings, the value of land affected by the taking must be considered in connection with the water or
water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the
city or town or the inhabitants thereof with water." I t
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is this statute that cities must comply with in any endeavor to acquire new water sources.
Cities exist only by virtue of statutory creation and
in their actions they are restricted to the exercise of those
powers that state statutes have expressly conferred upon
them. Therefore, if Spanish Fork City needs additional
water sources for the inhabitants of the territory seeking to be annexed, it must go to the statute which enables
it to obtain such water; i.e. the city must get such authority from 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953). If the city attempts to
acquire water sources in a manner other than that set
forth by that statute, it is an ultra vires act.
I n Bitholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 U.2d 385, 284
P.2d 702 (1955) at 703, the Utah Supreme Court said:
"In relation to the ultra vires question, it
should be noted that in this state, cities are
creatures of statute and limited in powers to
those deligated by the legislature which we have
characterized as: first, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation . . . " * * * "This court has generally adhered to a policy of rather strictly
limiting the extensionof the powers of a city
by implication."
See also Lark v- Whitehead, 28 U.2d 343, 502 P.2d 557
(1972). I n Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322,
481 P.2d 401 (1972) at 402, the New Mexico Court,
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in addressing itself to a situation wherein the City of
Santa Fe was attempting to enforce a provision requiring subdividors to pay the sum of $50*00 per lot for a
"Public Utilities Purchase Fund", found, among other
things, that since the statute ". . . does not specifically
confer . . . " such a right, the city was acting beyond its
authority.
Plaintiffs submit that such holdings on the ultra
vires issue place a requirement on Spanish Fork City to
follow, in this matter, the means of acquiring water
sources as expressly set forth by 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953),
and that unless the city uses the means of purchase,
lease or condemnation to obtain more water supplies,
it would be an ultra vires act.
The lower court in its ruling suggests that failure
of the city to require the forfeiture of the water from
plaintiffs would "• . . force a dilution of municipal services, and increase the tax burden to the citizens of the
municipality . . . " (R-ll, 12). Plaintiffs respectfully
submit that the lower court is mistaken in that assumption. First, there is no question here of whether the petitioners should transfer to the city any and all water
shares that petitioners have. Instead, the question is,
should petitioners be compensated for those shares?
Notwithstanding the lower court's contention, the
requirements of 10-7-4 U.C.A. (1953) place no financial burden upon the city in situations such as this. 107-7 U.C.A. (1953) through 10-7-9 U.C.A. (1953) gives
the municipality the power to issue Bonds and leavy tax
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assessments to initially finance the acquisition of any
such water sources. 10-7-10 U.C.A. (1953) gives a municipality the power to require the residents who use
the water to pay the city for such use. By authority of
that same statute, water connection fees and/or hookup
charges can be assessed to water users and property
owners in order to offset any and all expenses that the
city may have incurred in originally obtaining such
water. The state statutes have thus provided for the city
adequate and proper means to acquire and finance water
sources, and it is necessary that the city act within those
means. Clearly, the city must follow separately the mandates of the enabling statutes for acquisition of new
territory, for obtaining water for such territory, and
for being compensated for such water acquisition.
To require the petitioners for annexation to give
free and clear to the city a water sources, to allow the
city to impose other taxes relative to financing such
water, and finally, to allow the city to charge for the use
of such water, would clearly create a situation that
would not only by ultra vires, but would also unjustly
enrich the city.
Plaintiffs further argue that the city of Spanish
Fork cannot get around the mandate of 10-7-4 U.C.A.
(1953) by an allusion to some kind of contract or other
bargain between the parties whereby it appears that it
is being proposed that the city will annex in exchange
for the forfeiture of specific water shares or money by
plaintiffs. Not only can a municipality not enter into a
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contract which is beyond the scope of its power, see
King v. Alaska State Housing Authority, Alaska 512
P.2d 887 (1973) at 891. "A municipality cannot use
its police power for bargaining purposes . . ." Sheridan
v. Valley Sanitation District, 137 Colo. 315, 324 P.2d
1038. In State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. City of Sheboygan, III, Wis. 23, 86 N . W . 657, 662, that court said:
"To permit the city to base its action upon considerations of financial benefit to itself would
be allowing it to put its powers up for sale to
the highest bidder." * * * "We say without
hesitation that the city has no right to barter
with the police powers, or exact for itself financial benefits as a condition for its exercise.
Such power must be exercised for the public
good and public welfare, and not for public
gain."
See also: Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 223
Wis. 251, 270 N . W . 336.
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that to allow
the city to impose its condition on annexation in order
to acquire free additional water sources would go well
beyond the city's authority to act and would completely
abrogate the express provisions of 10-7-4 U.C-A.
(1953). That city is without authority to act contrary
to said enabling statute is clearly stated by the Utah
Court in the following quotation.
" A general power granted to the corporation to pass all ordinances necessary for the
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welfare of the corporation, is qualiifed and restricted by those other clauses and provisions
of the charter or the general law which specify
particular purposes for which ordinances may
be passed. Otherwise, the general clause would
confer authority to abrogate the limitations implied from the express provisions." Lark v.
Whitehead, supra.

POINT I I .
T H E LOWER COURT E R R E D IN ITS
F I N D I N G THAT T H E CITY'S REQUIREMENT THAT P L A I N T I F F ' S GIVE WATER
SHARES TO T H E CITY IS NOT A TAKING
OF PRIVATE PROPERTY W I T H O U T COMPENSATION.
The city of Spanish Fork cannot compel the plaintiffs to surrender their constitutionally protected right
that private property cannot be taken for a public purpose without just compensation as a pre-condition to the
city's exercising its discretionary power to annex.
10-3-1 U.C.A. (1953) very simply sets forth the
method by which a municipality may extend its corporate limits. Basically this entails the filing of the appropriate petition for annexation and the approval of
the city council. 10-3-1 U.C.A- (1953), however, has no
provisions for contracting or otherwise bargaining for
the privilege of annexation. The city asserts, and
plaintiffs agree, however, that it is within the city's per-
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rogative to proscribe certain reasonable conditions in
connection with annexation (R-4).
I n Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 17 U.2d 135, 493 P.2d
641 (1972) at 643, the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
"The determination of the boundaries of a city
and what may or may not be encompassed
therein, including annexation or severance, is a
legislative function to be performed by the governing body of the city. The courts are and
should be reluctant to intrude into the perrogative of the legislative branch of government,
and will interfere with such action only if it
plainly appears that it is so lacking in propriety and reason that it must be denied capricious and arbitrary, or is in excess of the
authority of the legislative body/' (emphasis
added)
The case clearly places a limitation on the kind of
conditions the city can impose.
The concept that cities have great latitude in carrying out their various discretionary power is not unique
to, nor confined to matters of annexation, and the Utah
Court has expressed its concern over court's intervening
in matters that are generally considered legislative perrogatives. However, in Gibbons and Reed v. North Salt
Lake City, 19 U.2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967) at 562,
this court said that it will interfere, ". . • if such ordinances are confiscatory, discriminatory, or unreasonable," and the court in Bradshaw v. Beaver City, supra,
placed the additional condition that the city's acts canDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not be ultra vires. Clearly then, this court has said it will
interfere in appropriate situations and plaintiffs respectfully submit that the present case is such a situation.
I t is necessary in this matter to go beyond the
simple proposition that a city has the right to impose
reasonable conditions upon annexation. I t is important'
here to consider and analyze the condition being imposed. The City of Spanish Fork is requiring as a condition to approving the annexation, that plaintiffs must
give to the city 2 acre feet of Strawberry Valley water
shares for every acre of land to be annexed. They must
give such water shares or the money equivalent not only
for their own property but for the property of other
dissenting property owners who are also within the territory to be annexed. This, by definition, is a classical
example of a taking of private property rights by a government body. The city is seeking to compel the plaintiffs to surrender a constitutional right as an inducement
to the city to exercise its discretionary power of completing the annexation.
Plaintiffs contend that it is elementary constitutional law that the government cannot seek to obtain
compliance with an unconstitutional demand by making
that illegal demand a condition upon which government
will act in any situation wherein discretion is vested in
government. This fundamental principal is more eloquently expressed by the United States Supreme Court
in Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S.
583 at 593. The court there said:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"It would be a palpable incongruity to strike
down an act of state legislation which, by words
of express divestment seeks to strip the citizen
of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable
privilege which the state threatens otherwise to
withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the
proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having the power to deny a privilege altogether,
may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit
to impose. But the power of the state in that
respect is not unlimited, (emphasis added) and
one of the limitations is that it may not impose
conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights. If the state may compel
the surrender of one constitutional right as a
condition of its favor, it may in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. I t is inconceivable
that guarantees embedded in the constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existance."
See also Bynum v. Schiro, D. C. 219 F . Supp. 204,
Plaintiffs respectfully draw the court's attention
to The Vagabond Club v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 318,
445 P.2d 691 (1968). This is an interesting case whose
constitutional issues closely parallel the constitutional
issues presently at hand. In that case, the Vagabond
Club had applied to Salt Lake City for a license to operate as a non profit social club. A city's perrogatives

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
to license or not to license in such situations are very
similar to a city's perrogatives to annex or not to annex.
I n the Vagabond Club case, Salt Lake City passed Ordinance Section 20-29-7 which required, as a condition
of obtaining such license, that the club be required to
furnish to the city police an appropriate key or other
devise that would permit the police to obtain immediate
entry and access to the club without notice or warrant.
The city argued eloquently that conditions for licensing
were perrogatives that belonged solely to the city and
that this requirement was necessary for the city police
to use as a tool for law enforcement- At page 696, the
Utah court struck down both that portion of the city
statute and the city's argument with these words,
"In the instant action, the provisions of the
ordinance which compel the clubs to provide a
key to the police, permit inspections for violations of the law and waive the necessity of a
warrant, proscribe the safeguards
of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States and are
therefore unconstitutional" (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs here urge that the proscription of the
Fifth Amendment as is being attempt by the city in the
instant case now before the court is no less tolerable
than the proscription of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment as in the Vagabond Club case.
If the city is allowed the perrogative of requiring
the plaintiffs to transfer to the city without compensaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion valuable water shares, before the city will complete
annexation, the city will at the same time be given the
power to completely abrogate the Fifth Amendment
guarantee that private property cannot be taken for a
public purpose without just compensation, and in effect,
such approval to the city could open the way for this
city and others in similar situations, to effectively do
away with the Bill of Rights.
POINT III.
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D ING T H E CONDITION FOR ANNEXATION
REASONABLE.
The requirement that the plaintiffs transfer to the
city, "water shares without compensation as a condition
for annexation is arbitrary and capricious.
Plaintiffs contend that conditions placed on annexation have traditionally been conditions requiring
that the territory to be annexed comply with existing
zoning ordinances, safety ordinances and tax ordinances.
See for example, the conditions imposed by the city in
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, supra. In other words, they
have been conditions related to the city's concern that
annexed property will, after annexation, be on the same
status and basis as property already within the corporate limits of the city.
I n the situation presently at hand, Spanish Fork
is attempting to impose conditions that do not pertain
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the status, the condition or the use of the property.
Nor is the condition aimed at any form of control of the
property. The condition is not even directed at all property owners of the proposed territory for annexation.
I t is instead aimed at the petitioners for annexation.
Plaintiffs contend that it is this departure from the concept of placing the condition on the property to the concept of placing condition on some of the property owners within the territory, that leads to the inequality of
the treatment among the people involved.
Defendant herein readily admits and does not controvert the fact that if a person or persons subdivide any
given number of acres of land within the city limits, such
person or persons will not be required to forfeit water
shares as these plaintiffs are being so required. Instead,
the city will purchase water shares from such 'in
city' subdividers. (R-52)- Obviously, the subdivision of
property within the city's limits can clearly present the
same problem to the city, relative to the supply of water
service to householders, as annexation of property can.
These plaintiffs then are having a burden placed on them
that property owners within the city are not experiencing.
I n essence, the majority property owners of this
territory must, by the city's terms, (1) forfeit their own
water shares, and (2) provide additional water shares
for the territory's minority property owners. They must
do this, notwithstanding the fact that the minority property owners do not have to forfeit their water shares, nor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have any of the other of the city's inhabitants, including
'in city' subdividers. I t is this inherrent inequality among
the plaintiffs, the minority property owners within the
territory to be annexed, and the present inhabitants of
the city which render this condition so arbitrary, and
which creates a denial of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The lower court in the reasoning given for its ruling stated: "The extension of municipal facilities to new
territory requiring servicing by water, power, sewer,
roads, etc., would reasonably require that the legislative
body provide the resources within the project area
needed to assist in providing the municipal facilities to
be transferred without compensation to the municipality
if annexation is allowed." ( R - l l ) . Plaintiffs take exception to such reasoning.
The lower court has lumped together "resources"
and "facilities" and spoken generally of ". . . servicing
by water, power, sewer, roads, etc. . . ."• Roads, sewer
lines, power lines, and water lines are facilities, and all
of them can, by state statutory authority, be required
to be furnished without cost to the city. However, the
water that goes into the water lines, and the power that
goes in the power lines are resources.
Following the reasoning of the lower court, hypothetically a city that has its own electric utility company (for example Bountiful), could require petitioners for annexation, because the "legislative body must
provide resources within the area" ( R - l l ) to provide
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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two shares of Utah Power and Light stock for each acre
of land being annexed. I t would seem by the court's
reasoning, that if a city can require, as a condition, two
acre feet of an irrigation water stock for each acre of
land annexed, that a city could also require, as a condition, two shares of Utah Power and Light stock for
each acre being annexed. I t would appear necessary only
that it be done with the stated purpose of furnishing resources to the new area.
The court below, continuing with its reasoning,
states that if such requirements cannot be imposed then
it ". . . would make annexation a matter of right by
simply meeting the statutory requirements . . . " ( R - l l ) .
Plaintiffs have acknowledged that the city's perrogatives in the area of annexation are substantial. However, the distressing implication of the lower court's
ruling is that cities, under the guise of protecting the
city's interests, can operate with little or no limitations
on those perrogatives- To grant cities such broad discretionary powers, without state statuatory authority
for the city's acts would be improper and unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
The state's statutes p r o v i d e ample authority
for the city of Spanish Fork to acquire water sources
and to be adequately and properly compensated for such
acquisitions. The city should be required to act within
the authority granted by those statutes. To give the
city the power to require petitioners for annexation to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provide water shares or money to the city for and in
behalf of the dissenting property owners as well as themselves is clearly a taking of private property without
compensation and violates the protection, afforded such
petitioners, of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The city's actions in picking and choosing among
the persons who must thus finance new water sources
for the city is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and
clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
Respectfully submitted,
F R E D G. B I E S I N G E R
1600-A Millcreek Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for

Appellants
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